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John locke personhood bill

          John Locke accepted the concept of soul, but viewed personhood of the individual as a distinct state, closely tied to consciousness—“Socrates asleep, and.

        1. John Locke accepted the concept of soul, but viewed personhood of the individual as a distinct state, closely tied to consciousness—“Socrates asleep, and.
        2. The rise of corporate personhood and corporate power more generally, has been in marked tension with the increased regulation of pollution and.
        3. Within the abundant literature on Locke's views on personhood, a number of contemporary accounts endeavour to answer a seemingly simple question.
        4. A broad definition of “constitutional personhood” is the status of a human being or legal entity with some or all constitutional rights.
        5. Locke's view, so far as its Personal identity or Personhood is concerned.

          6. Within the abundant literature on Locke's views on personhood, a number of contemporary accounts endeavour to answer a seemingly simple question....

          Locke on Personal Identity

          Locke’s most thorough discussion of the persistence (or diachronic identity) of persons can be found in Book 2, Chapter 27 of the Essay (“Of Identity and Diversity”), though Locke anticipates this discussion as early as Book 1, Chapter 4, Section 5, and Locke refers to persons in other texts, including the Second Treatise of Government.

          The discussion of persons and their persistence conditions also features prominently in Locke’s lengthy exchange with Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester (1697–1699).

          Locke begins “Of Identity and Diversity” by first getting clear on the principle of individuation, and by setting out what some have called the place-time-kind principle—which stipulates that no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time, and no individual can be in two different places at the same time (L-N 2.27.1).[2] With some of the basics of identity in place, Locke